Saint Anselm's proof: A problem of reference, intentional identity and mutual understanding

Abstract

Saint Anselm’s proof for God’s existence in his Proslogion, as the label “ontological” retrospectively hung on it indicates, is usually treated as involving some sophisticated problem of, or a much less sophisticated tampering with, the concept of existence. In this paper I intend to approach Saint Anselm’s reasoning from a somewhat different angle.

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2009-01-28

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Gyula Klima
Fordham University

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Citations of this work

Conceptual Closure in Anselm's Proof.Tony Roark - 2003 - History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (1):1-14.
Learning From Anselm´s Argument.Desidério Murcho - 2021 - Manuscrito 44 (4):418-433.
Platonism.Stephen Gersh - 2011 - In H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Springer. pp. 1016--1022.

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