Connectives without truth tables

Natural Language Semantics 20 (2):137-175 (2012)
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There are certain uses of and and or that cannot be explained by their normal meanings as truth-functional connectives, even with sophisticated pragmatic resources. These include examples such as The cops show up, and a fight will break out (‘If the cops show up, a fight will break out’), and I have no friends, or I would throw a party (‘I have no friends. If I did have friends, I would throw a party.’). We argue that these uses are indeed distinct from the more ordinary uses of and and or, but that they are nonetheless related in a principled way. To explain them we give an analysis of what we call the dynamic effects of connectives, which arise in all their uses. The special uses at issue are then argued to be instances where the connectives exhibit their dynamic effects without their truth-conditional meaning



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Daniel Rothschild
University College London

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Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

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