Maudlin on computation

Abstract

I argue that computationalism is compatible with a plausible supervenience thesis about conscious states. The most plausible way of making it compatible, however, involves abandoning counterfactual conditions on implementation

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Colin Klein
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Why computers can't feel pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.
Why Computers Can’t Feel Pain.John Mark Bishop - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):507-516.

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