Abstract

Contemporary scientific theories assume a predominantly micro-deterministic view of the world. This thesis examines the philosophical problems inherent in such a world-view. I begin with a characterization of micro-determination as a mode of determination in which higher-level macro-properties of a natural system are the result of lower-level micro-properties of that system. I argue that this conception of micro-determination presupposes a part-whole relation which derives from spatiotemporal proper inclusion. ;I next consider causal models of micro-determination. Humean and neo-Humean models are rejected because they neither adequately characterize the determinative priority of micro-structure, nor properly emphasize the critical role played by micro-mechanisms in determination. A supervenient model of micro-determination is then considered and I argue that it better characterizes the determinative priority of micro-structure in virtue of the priority relations that hold between micro-properties and macro-properties as families of properties. ;In chapter IV I argue that scientific explanation must involve a mechanism of determination and that, since micro-determinative connections are what underpin micro-explanatory relations, to provide a micro-determinative scenario may be what it is to provide a micro-mechanism. ;I close with a consideration of various concepts of the emergence of macro-properties. I identify four separate concepts of emergence and argue that, while three are not incompatible with micro-determinism, the concept of emergence involving macro-determination appears to fail in meeting the mechanism requirement of complete scientific explanation