Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons

Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325 (1999)
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10.1111/0029-4624.33.s13.14

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reprint Klein, Peter D. (1999) "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons". Noûs 33(s13):297-325
reprint Klein, Peter (2007) "Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning". Philosophical Studies 134(1):1 - 17

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Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.
Viciousness and the structure of reality.Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):399-418.
Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.

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