How Do Technological Artefacts Embody Moral Values?

Philosophy and Technology 34 (3):525-544 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to some philosophers of technology, technology embodies moral values in virtue of its functional properties and the intentions of its designers. But this paper shows that such an account makes the values supposedly embedded in technology epistemically opaque and that it does not allow for values to change. Therefore, to overcome these shortcomings, the paper introduces the novel Affordance Account of Value Embedding as a superior alternative. Accordingly, artefacts bear affordances, that is, artefacts make certain actions likelier given the circumstances. Based on an interdisciplinary perspective that invokes recent moral anthropology, I conceptualize affordances as response-dependent properties. That is, they depend on intrinsic as well as extrinsic properties of the artefact. We have reason to value these properties. Therefore, artefacts embody values and are not value-neutral, which has practical implications for the design of new technologies.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,319

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is Technology Value-Neutral?Boaz Miller - 2021 - Science, Technology, and Human Values 46 (1):53-80.
Verbeek on the Moral Agency of Artifacts.Ehsan Arzroomchilar & Daniel D. Novotný - 2018 - Organon F. Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (4):517–538.
Moral Status, Final Value, and Extrinsic Properties.Nicolas Delon - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):371-379.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-15

Downloads
109 (#168,802)

6 months
26 (#142,339)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Klenk
Delft University of Technology

References found in this work

Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.
Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
Do artifacts have politics?Langdon Winner - 1980 - Daedalus 109 (1):121--136.

View all 28 references / Add more references