Determinism, Blameworthiness, and Deprivation

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (1990)
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Abstract

This book casts new light on the traditional disagreement between those who hold that we cannot be morally responsible for our actions if they are causally determined, and those who deny this. Klein suggests that reflection on the relation between justice and deprivation offers a way out of this perplexity

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Citations of this work

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Deciding to act.Alfred R. Mele - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (1):81–108.
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