Why Am I Me and Not Someone Else?

Abstract

In this article I discuss the seeming contingency of the fact that one is the specific person that one is. Here, I propose that this contingency is illusory.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Subjectivity and the limits of narrative.Joseph Neisser - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):51-66.
'I' am a Fiction: An Analysis of the No-self Theories.Vineet Sahu - 2012 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1-2):117-128.
Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience.Matthew R. Longo & Manos Tsakiris - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):429-430.
Narrative identity, practical identity and ethical subjectivity.Kim Atkins - 2004 - Continental Philosophy Review 37 (3):341-366.
Bat or Batman?David Pugmire - 1989 - Philosophy 64 (April):207-17.
Nagel’s Vista or Taking Suhjectivity Seriously.Charles Taliaferro - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):393-401.
What is it like to be a person?Norton Nelkin - 1987 - Mind and Language 2 (3):220-41.
Indexicality and self-awareness.Tomis Kapitan - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 379--408.
The status of humans in Nagel's phenomenology.Paul G. Muscari - 1987 - Philosophical Forum 19 (1):23-33.
Crossing the bridge: the first-person and time.Patrick Stokes - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):295-312.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-06-12

Downloads
11,956 (#267)

6 months
947 (#1,100)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tim Klaassen
Tilburg University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
The unreality of time.John Ellis McTaggart - 1908 - Mind 17 (68):457-474.

View all 24 references / Add more references