Abstract

It is the focus of this dissertation to articulate Pascal’s position, which may be viewed as a middle ground between skepticism and dogmatism; a position that induces the reader to seek. The second and third chapters will be devoted to Pascal’s rejections of dogmatism and skepticism. By identifying his reasons for rejecting these two views, the middle position that Pascal attempts to hold will become clear. The fourth chapter will investigate the concept of divine illumination, first in Augustine, and then as it is passed down to Descartes and Pascal. The fifth chapter will be focused on articulating Pascal’s account of the heart, which allows for what I have termed dependent certainty. Chapter six will be devoted to placing this position within the landscape of contemporary epistemology, and specifically in arguing to what extent it ought to be interpreted as a kind of fideism and suggesting commonalities between Pascal’s eudaimonaic account and contemporary virtue epistemology.