Abstract

ABSTRACT I suggest how a broadly Kantian critique of classical logic might spring from reflections on constructibility conditions. According to Kant, mathematics is concerned with objects that are given through ‘arbitrary synthesis,’ in the form of ‘constructions of concepts’ in the medium of ‘pure intuition.’ Logic, by contrast, is narrowly constrained – it has no objects of its own and is fixed by the very forms of thought. That is why there is not much room for developments within logic, as compared to the progress in mathematics. Kant’s view of logic remains critical, though – through considerations that are effectively on the scope and limits of classical logic and which play a part in his transcendental idealism. The most important ones are to be found in his critique of the use of reductio ad absurdum proofs in metaphysics and his solutions to the ‘antinomies of pure reason.’ Arguably, these considerations carry over to mathematics as well – by way of ‘analogues’ to the antinomies – in particular in resolving infinity paradoxes.