Ethics and Information Technology 22 (1):93-102 (2020)

Abstract
The gamer’s dilemma :31–36, 2009) asks whether any ethical features distinguish virtual pedophilia, which is generally considered impermissible, from virtual murder, which is generally considered permissible. If not, this equivalence seems to force one of two conclusions: either both virtual pedophilia and virtual murder are permissible, or both virtual pedophilia and virtual murder are impermissible. In this article, I attempt, first, to explain the psychological basis of the dilemma. I argue that the two different action types picked out by “virtual pedophilia” and “virtual murder” set very different expectations for their token instantiations that systematically bias judgments of permissibility. In particular, the proscription of virtual pedophilia rests on intuitions about immoral desire, sexual violations, and a schematization of a powerful adult offending against an innocent child. I go on to argue that these differences between virtual pedophilia and virtual murder may be ethically relevant. Precisely because virtual pedophilia is normally aversive in a way that virtual murder is not, we plausibly expect virtual pedophilia to invite abnormal and immorally desirous forms of engagement.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10676-019-09518-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 68,944
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.
Mapping the Moral Domain.Jesse Graham, Brian A. Nosek, Jonathan Haidt, Ravi Iyer, Spassena Koleva & Peter H. Ditto - 2011 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101 (2):366-385.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Has Bartel Resolved the Gamer’s Dilemma?Morgan Luck & Nathan Ellerby - 2013 - Ethics and Information Technology 15 (3):229-233.
Has Ali Dissolved the Gamer’s Dilemma?Morgan Luck - 2018 - Ethics and Information Technology 20 (3):157-162.
Pornography, Ethics, and Video Games.Stephanie L. Patridge - 2013 - Ethics and Information Technology 15 (1):25-34.
Mackie's Motivational Argument.Philip Clark - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (ed.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Internalists Beware—We Might All Be Amoralists!Gunnar Björnsson & Ragnar Francén Olinder - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):1 - 14.
Motivational Internalism and the Challenge of Amoralism.Danielle Bromwich - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):452-471.
Pushing the Intuitions Behind Moral Internalism.Derek Leben & Kristine Wilckens - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):510-528.
A Humean Theory of Moral Intuition.Antti Kauppinen - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3):360-381.
A New Solution to the Gamer’s Dilemma.Rami Ali - 2015 - Ethics and Information Technology 17 (4):267-274.
Intuition and Belief in Moral Motivation.Antti Kauppinen - 2015 - In Gunnar Björnsson (ed.), Moral Internalism. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-11-18

Total views
52 ( #215,945 of 2,498,147 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #118,816 of 2,498,147 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes