Scientific understanding and the causal structure of the world

In Philip Kitcher & Wesley Salmon (eds.), Scientific Explanation. Univ of Minnesota Pr. pp. 410--505 (1989)
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Patricia Kitcher
Columbia University

Citations of this work

Testifying understanding.Kenneth Boyd - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):103-127.
Is Mathematics a Domain for Philosophers of Explanation?Erik Weber & Joachim Frans - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (1):125-142.
A constructivist perspective on physics.Peter Fletcher - 2002 - Philosophia Mathematica 10 (1):26-42.

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