Kant on self-identity

Philosophical Review 91 (1):41-72 (1982)
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Abstract

Despite Kemp Smith's claims to the contrary, I show that there is good reason to believe that Kant was aware of Hume's attack on personal identity. My interpretive claim is that we can make sense of many of Kant's puzzling remarks in the subjective deduction by assuming that he was trying to reply to Hume's challenge. My substantive claim is that Kant succeeds in defending a notion of the self as a continuing sequence of informationally interdependent states.

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Patricia Kitcher
Columbia University

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