Abstract
The concept of Triebfeder, commonly translated into English as “incentive,” plays a crucial role in Kant’s moral philosophy. In the Critique of Practical Reason, in which a whole chapter is dedicated to the Triebfedern of pure practical reason, Kant argues that the moral law is not only the objective determining ground of the will but also functions as a Triebfeder, that is, as a subjective determining ground of the will. Kant’s concept of Trieb, by contrast, is much less clearly defined, and its meaning remains in many ways ambivalent. In the second part of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, for instance, Kant refers to Blumenbach’s idea of Bildungstrieb in order to describe the unique formative powers of organic nature. This chapter offers a detailed comparison of the two etymologically related but philosophically distinct conceptions of Triebfeder and Trieb and draws special attention to the shift of focus that occurs in the third Critique.