Abstract

Wise men have argued that one cannot refer to what does not exist. It has even been maintained that one cannot meaningfully deny the existence of what does not exist, for to do so would be tantamount to referring to such nonexistents. Against this view, Alexius von Meinong in his "Theory of Objects," argued that not only can we make meaningful assertions about nonexistents, i.e. we can in fact refer to them, but further that nonexistents are objects. ;Bertrand Russell presented several objections to Meinong's theory. If one allows nonexistent objects into one's ontology, Russell argued, the violation of several logical laws would result. This Meinong-Russell debate continues today in the works of several philosophers who have taken it upon themselves to defend Meinong's theory by presenting their own theories of nonexistent objects which they state are immune to Russell's objections. Terence Parsons, William Rapaport and Richard Routley are three current defenders of Meinong. In this dissertation, I examine each of these quasi-Meinongian theories. Although each of these men do provide answers to Russell's objections, they do not achieve this without paying a price. And, the price they pay is to exclude one or more of the major premises of Meinong's original theory from their own theories. The effect of such an exclusion is that these Meinongian theories are somewhat less than Meinongian in import. ;Like Parsons, Rapaport and Routley, however, I too believe that Meinong was correct in claiming that one can make meaningful assertions about nonexistents. In order to show how this is possible, I present a sketch of a semantics for fiction. Within the context of this method, one is not committed to nonexistent objects. Yet, this method does allow one to make true and false assertions about such nonexistents. Through the use of the intensional operator, 'according to the account,' and the notion of an enrichment of an account, I show that one can make true and false assertions about that which does not exist