How physicalists can avoid reductionism

Synthese 108 (2):157-70 (1996)
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Abstract

  Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false

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Robert Kirk
University of Ulster

Citations of this work

Can physicalism be non-reductive?Andrew Melnyk - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1281-1296.
Physicalism and strict implication.Robert Kirk - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):523-536.
Phenomenology and psychophysics.Steven Horst - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):1-21.
Nonreductive physicalism and strict implication.Robert Kirk - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):544-552.
The prospects for Kirk's non-reductive physicalism.Andrew Melnyk - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):323-32.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
What is it Like to be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press.
Psychologism and behaviorism.Ned Block - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.

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