Authors
Jens Kipper
University of Rochester
Abstract
In this paper, I identify and discuss the following feature of our judgments about hypothetical scenarios concerning the identity of persons: with respect to the vast majority of scenarios, both members of a pair of logically complementary propositions about personal identity are conceivable. I consider a number of explanations of this feature that draw on the metaphysics and the epistemology of personal identity, none of which prove to be satisfactory. I then argue that in order to give an adequate explanation, one needs to recognize an important characteristic of our concept of personal identity: it is such that if there are mental substances (or the like), they constitute personal identity. At the same time, there can still be persons if there are no such substances. Since this finding casts doubts on the way that thought experiments about personal identity are usually set up, I end by outlining its potential consequences for the debate over the identity of persons.
Keywords personal identity  conceivability  thought experiments
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.001
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,231
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

On What is a Priori About Necessities.Jens Kipper - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):235-243.
Personal Identity, Possible Worlds, and Medical Ethics.Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Substance Concepts and Personal Identity.Peter Nichols - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):255-270.
Hume and Reid on Personal Identity.Paul Chester Boling - 1989 - Dissertation, The University of Tennessee
The Concept of Substance.C. Mason Myers - 1977 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (4):505-519.
Tomás de Aquino y la Identidad Personal.Chirstopher Martin - 1993 - Anuario Filosófico 26 (2):249-260.
John Locke on Personal Identity.N. Nimbalkar - 2011 - Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1):268.
A Defence of Quasi-Memory.Rebecca Roache - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (2):323-355.
Personal Identity.H. P. Grice - 1941 - Mind 50 (October):330-350.
Personal Identity.John Perry (ed.) - 1975 - University of California Press.
Locke's Psychology of Personal Identity.Raymond Martin - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):41-61.
Hume’s Discussion on the Personal Identity.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2005 - Bihar Jounal of Philosophical Research (00):189-197.
Ch'an Buddhism, Western Thought, and the Concept of Substance.Paul Wienpahl - 1971 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 14 (1-4):84 – 101.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-03-04

Total views
58 ( #197,947 of 2,518,168 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #272,129 of 2,518,168 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes