On what is a priori about necessities

Analysis 78 (2):235-243 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many have argued that there is something that is a priori about all necessary truths, including a posteriori necessities. According to a particularly popular claim of this kind, one can know a priori whether a sentence is G-necessary, i.e. whether it is either necessarily true or necessarily false. In this paper, I identify the most plausible version of this claim and I argue that it fails. My discussion also reveals, and depends upon, an important feature of putative natural kind terms that has been widely overlooked. I conclude by outlining a proposal of what is really a priori about necessities.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,347

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

There are brute necessities.Bruno Whittle - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):149-159.
Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
How to be a type-C physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.
Propositional apriority and the nesting problem.Jens Kipper - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1091-1104.
Presupposition and the a priori.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.
A priori and a posteriori.Jason S. Baehr - 2003 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Priori Knowledge and Infallibility.Ivette Fred - 1997 - Dissertation, City University of New York
The a Priori in Philosophy.Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-29

Downloads
202 (#100,198)

6 months
17 (#152,346)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jens Kipper
University of Rochester

References found in this work

The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.

View all 37 references / Add more references