Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):431 - 448 (2012)

Authors
Chris King
Miami University, Ohio
Abstract
This paper identifies strands of reasoning underlying several theories of democratic authority. It shows why each of them fails to adequately explain or justify it. Yet, it does not claim (per philosophical anarchism) that democratic authority cannot be justified. Furthermore, it sketches an argument for a perspective on the justification of democratic authority that would effectively respond to three problems not resolved by alternative theories—the problem of the expert, the problem of specificity, and the problem of deference. Successfully resolving these problems is at least evidence for the viability of a justification of democratic authority. This perspective integrates procedural concerns with those about the quality of democratic outcomes. It shows that democratic authority, if there is such a thing, requires reliable democratic procedures as the only sort citizens could rationally accept
Keywords Authority  Consent  Democracy  Duty to obey  Epistemic
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-011-9301-z
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References found in this work BETA

Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Harvard University Press.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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