Methodological Solipsism and the Multiverse

Philosophy Today 48 (3):255-263 (2004)
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Abstract

"Methodological Solipsism and the Multiverse" defends the many-universes interpretation of quantum physics, but draws attention to a major philosophical obstacle to the interpretation's acceptance: the question of why, if there are many universes, all on a par with one another, at a particular time the 'I' is manifest in only one. This is known as the 'preferred basis' problem. The so-called methodological solipsism approach, introduced by Driesch and employed by philosophers, such as Putnam and Fodor, is used to answer the question

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Daniel King
California State University, Northridge

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