Abstract

This thesis argues for a contextualist theory of moral judgment by answering the question: What are the general characteristics of the moral context of discovery? The goal is both to criticize the foundationalist approach to moral theory which focusses exclusively on the problems of moral justification and also to articulate a contextualist ethics which is immune to the charge of relativism. The position taken is that moral judgments presuppose a process of moral interpretation and understanding. Moral situations do not come already constituted, but are the products of moral understanding. This understanding, however, draws not only on moral character, but also on the moral practices of the community. It is not, therefore, a private understanding immune to public criticism. Contextualist ethics must seek a typology of moral situations as well as a developed conception of moral interpretation and understanding. It is argued that in conceptualizing the moral agent as embedded within the situation, the judgment which results must itself be conceived as bound up with the situation. The conclusion is that moral judgments are internally related to moral understanding, and that therefore justification is dependent on a prior grasp of the moral context of discovery. The implication is that moral theory cannot be legislative in its aspirations, but should contribute to an understanding of the resources available to moral agents who necessarily confront morally problematic situations, both personal and political, from the standpoint of the context of discovery. The argument draws on the pragmatist notion of the problematic situation, Kant's notion of reflective judgment, Hannah Arendt's theory of the public sphere, and Justus Buchler's theory of judgment. At the same time, it makes use of anti-foundationalists such as Carol Gilligan, Lawrence Blum, and several philosophers like Sabina Lovibond, Stuart Hampshire, and D. Z. Phillips and H. O. Mounce who are influenced by Wittgenstein