Abstract

A theory of content is a theory of why it is that our mental states are about what they actually are about: why, for example, my belief that snow is white is about the whiteness of snow rather than, as it might be, the greenness of grass. A teleological theory of content is one which accounts for the content of mental states in terms of the functions of either the mental states themselves or the mechanisms which produce them. In this dissertation I defend a particular teleological theory of content: that of Ruth Millikan. I begin by discussing what the criteria of success are for a theory of content. I then present and criticize a rival teleological theory, that of David Papineau, and go on to show that Millikan's theory is not susceptible to the objections which are fatal to Papineau's. I then defend Millikan's theory against various objections, concluding that the theory, when properly understood, can withstand the standard objections to naturalistic theories of content and also the objections which have been directed at teleological theories in particular