Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction

In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press (2003)
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Jaegwon Kim
Last affiliation: Brown University

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Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2015 - In Tomasz Bigaj & Christian Wüthrich (eds.), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. pp. 251-306.
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The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
The mind as the software of the brain.Ned Block - 1995 - In Daniel N. Osherson, Lila Gleitman, Stephen M. Kosslyn, S. Smith & Saadya Sternberg (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Second Edition, Volume 3. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. pp. 377-425.
From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation.David Yates - forthcoming - In Alastair Wilson & Katie Robertson (eds.), Levels of Explanation. Oxford University Press.

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