Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):739 - 749 (2011)
AbstractThe ?Dimensioned? view analyzes (multiple) realization in terms of compositional relation, and the ?Flat? view analyzes (multiple) realization in terms of causal-functional mechanism. The two different analyses of realization lead to the disagreement about whether realization is transitive. The two views, perhaps not surprisingly, have different consequences on testing for multiple realization, and prescribe different ?reconstructions? for the evidential significance of observation for multiple realization. I examine the differences between the two views on testing for multiple realization within a model-selection theoretical framework. I claim that the model-selection theoretical framework provides a ground to discuss and assess evidence for multiple realization
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
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