Imprecise Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation

Foundations of Science 28 (2):755-781 (2023)
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Abstract

According to van Fraassen, inference to the best explanation (IBE) is incompatible with Bayesianism. To argue to the contrary, many philosophers have suggested hybrid models of scientific reasoning with both explanationist and probabilistic elements. This paper offers another such model with two novel features. First, its Bayesian component is imprecise. Second, the domain of credence functions can be extended.

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Namjoong Kim
Gyeongsang National University

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References found in this work

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
The inference to the best explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.

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