Das Leben der Form: Praktische Vernunft nach Kant und Hegel
In Maria Muhle & Christiane Voss (eds.),
Black Box Leben. Berlin: August. pp. 107–137 (
2017)
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Abstract
The paper investigates the Kantian idea that a rational life is a life of “mere form”—a life in which a “mere form” is the force or spring of action. I start by developing Kant’s practical notion of life—the capacity to be the cause of what one represents. In a second step, I investigate the way in which Kant characterizes a rational life—the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws and to determine ourselves by the mere form of a practical rule. In the third section, I point to some of the attractions and some of the problems of such an account. I close by considering a Hegelian alternative: the notion that a rational life is not the life of “mere,” but of “absolute form.”