Acceding to the demand that public policy should be based on “the best available evidence” can come at significant moral cost. Important policy questions cannot be addressed using “the best available evidence” as defined by the evidence-based policy paradigm; the paradigm can change the meaning of questions so that they can be addressed using the preferred kind of evidence; and important evidence that does not meet the standard defined by the paradigm can get ignored. We illustrate these problems in three contexts of evidence-based policy.
Keywords evidence-based policy   evidence-based initiatives  randomized controlled trials  behavioral economics  development economics  nudge theory
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DOI 10.1080/08913811.2019.1688520
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References found in this work BETA

From Libertarian Paternalism to Nudging—and Beyond.Adrien Barton & Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):341-359.
A Pragmatist Theory of Evidence.Julian Reiss - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):341-362.

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Metaphors in Arts and Science.Walter Veit & Ney Milan - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-24.
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