Abstract
Husserl's phenomenology abandoned the fundamental phenomenological task of investigating pure appearance in favour of research into transcendent knowledge of essences. Thereby, in place of the original cogitano with its capacity for self-giving, the intentional intuition came to present itself as a mode of givenness without a radical phenomenalization of the ontologically pre-given. M. Henry, who already elaborated a „material phenomenology“ of the original hyletic self-affection as immanence of life, has demonstrated the deficiency of the phenomenological differentiation of appearing from appearance by invoking four principles of phenomenology. These concern the relation between being /appearing, intuition /evidence, method /things in themselves, and reduction /givenness. Regarding this last connection J.-L. Marion's recent phenomenological approach is also worth taking into account. With the „pure appeal“, Marion at the same time questions Heidegger's priority of Dasein on behalf of the Ego