Mind and Language 10 (4):402-22 (1995)

Authors
Muhammad Ali Khalidi
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
Two main theories of concepts have emerged in the recent psychological literature: the Prototype Theory (which considers concepts to be self-contained lists of features) and the Theory Theory (which conceives of them as being embedded within larger theoretical networks). Experiments supporting the first theory usually differ substantially from those supporting the second, which suggests that these the· ories may be operating at different levels of explanation and dealing with different entities. A convergence is proposed between the Theory Theory and the intentional stance in the philosophy of language and mind. From this stance, concepts should not be thought of as concrete physical entities
Keywords Concepts  Prototype Theory  Theory Theory  Intentional Stance
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00021.x
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Rules and Representations.Noam A. Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (127):1-61.
Rules and Representations.Noam Chomsky - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):1-15.

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Citations of this work BETA

Incommensurability in Cognitive Guise.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):29 – 43.
Lexical Concepts as Fluctuating Structures.Alyona Budnikova - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):135-153.

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