Incommensurability in cognitive guise

Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):29 – 43 (1998)
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Abstract

Philosophers and historians of science have made the claim that successive scientific theories are incommensurable, that is, that many or all of their concepts fail to coincide. This claim has been echoed by cognitive psychologists who have applied it to the successive conceptual schemes of young children, or of children and adults. This paper examines the psychological evidence for the claim and proposes ways of reinterpreting it which do not involve imputing incommensurability. An alternative approach to understanding conceptual change is suggested, according to which novel concepts are introduced against a background of shared concepts, rather than as part of incommensurable conceptual schemes.

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Muhammad Ali Khalidi
CUNY Graduate Center

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.
Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use.Noam Chomsky - 1986 - Prager. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
Against method.Paul Feyerabend - 1975 - London: New Left Books.

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