Review: Sedgwick (ed), The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel [Book Review]

Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2):302-303 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2003) 302-303 [Access article in PDF] Sedgwick, Sally, ed. The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Pp. x + 338. Cloth, $59.95. This collection consists almost entirely of papers from a 1995 conference at Dartmouth on "The Idea of a System of Transcendental Idealism in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel." Four categories of papers address: (1) the relation between Kant's three Critiques and the Opus Postumum; (2) Fichte's reception of the Critical Philosophy; (3) Schelling's Naturphilosophie as a reaction to Kant and Fichte; and (4) Hegel's indebtedness to and famous departure from Kantianism.In "The Unity of Nature and Freedom: Kant's Conception of the System of Philosophy," Paul Guyer argues that, appearances aside, Kant's thought from the first Critique to the Opus Postumum forms a continuous and self-consistent project. Indeed, Guyer claims that Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy remained essentially unchanged throughout this period (this despite frequent—and often flattering—remarks in the Opus Postumum concerning Spinoza). In contrast, Jeffrey Edwards' "Spinozism, Freedom, and Transcendental Dynamics in Kant's Final System of Transcendental Idealism" points to a conceptual tension present in Kant's late attempt to find common ground between Spinoza and transcendental idealism. Edwards argues that Kant's notion in the Opus Postumum of a dynamical form of matter leads him to embrace a realist (quasi-Spinozistic) conception of space. Finally, in "Is the Critique of Judgment Post-Critical?" Henry Allison challenges the view (common from Hegel to Guyer) that a profound change in Kant's project occurs in the Critique of Judgment, viz., that something profoundly un-transcendental emerges with Kant's notions of the intuitive intellect and purposiveness of nature.Günter Zöller, in "From Critique to Metacritique: Fichte's Transformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism," offers an interpretation of the development of notions of "system" and "transcendental idealism" from Kant to Fichte. This is an indispensable paper for anyone concerned with the fine points of this development and, [End Page 302] indeed, Zöller's treatment is throughout a model of clarity. In "The Spirit of the Wissenschaftslehre," Daniel Breazeale offers an outstanding survey of the defining features of Fichte's early Jena Wissenschaftslehre. The breadth and depth of Breazeale's paper is a signal achievement, one that puts before the reader's eyes the lay of the often convoluted and confusing land that is the Wissenschaftslehre. Furthermore, Breazeale's discussion of the subdivisions of the Wissenschaftslehre (i.e., the particular sciences grounded by the "science of science") is of particular benefit for understanding the totality of Fichte's conception of philosophy."The 'I' as Principle of Philosophy" by Allen Wood, and "The Practical Foundation of Philosophy in Kant, Fichte, and After" by Karl Ameriks offer differing evaluations of the kind of "primacy of the practical" that each author locates in Fichte. Ameriks rejects Wood's sympathetic reading of the fundamentally practical character of the Fichtean "I." What is at stake for the authors is the success or failure of Fichte's attempt to account for the unity of theoretical and practical reason. It is important to note however that, unlike Kant, Fichte does not subscribe to the "primacy of the practical" thesis; indeed, Fichte holds the two aspects of reason to be "equiprimordial." As such, some of Wood's and Ameriks' claims are either misleading or simply wrong. This point aside, a common criticism of Fichte is that he reduces the world to the bare posit of the "I," a view of which Robert Pippin's "Fichte's Alleged Subjective, Psychological, One-Sided Idealism" quickly disposes. Instead, Pippin presents a "normative non-psychologistic" interpretation of Fichtean idealism.Regarding Schelling's Kant-reception, Manfred Baum's "The Beginnings of Schelling's Philosophy of Nature" locates the origins of Schelling's Naturphilosophie in his youthful interpretation of Plato's Timaeus. Baum's analyses, which abound with rich historical and philological information, are complemented by Dieter Sturma's...

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Kant's categories and the capacity to judge: Responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedgwick.Beatrice Longuenesse - 2000 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):91 – 110.
Hegel, Mcdowell and Recent Defences of Kant.Sally Sedgwick - 2000 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology (3):229-247.
Hegel's critique of the subjective idealism of Kant's ethics.Sally S. Sedgwick - 1988 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (1):89-105.
Hegel's Strategy and Critique of Kant's Mathematical Antinomies.Sally Sedgwick - 1991 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (4):423 - 440.
Pippin on Hegel’s Critique of Kant.Sally Sedgwick - 1993 - International Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):273-283.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
22 (#669,532)

6 months
3 (#902,269)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kevin Zanelotti
University of Kentucky

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references