Methodologische regeln Des kritischen rationalismus

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 9 (2):236-255 (1978)
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Abstract

Summary In his Logic of Scientific Discovery and also in Conjectures and Refutations Karl Popper laid down methodological rules. They were to secure severe tests of our theories so that we might at least prove our false theories to be false, if we cannot prove our true theories to be true. But falsification turned out to be as impossible as verification. What is more, the rules, which are here examined, do not even advance criticism of theories. Either they are trivial or not applicable or even untenable or they refer to problems, which do not exist. There is no reason to expect that those rules, which we could not here examine, are essentially different. Hence applying the methodological rules of critical rationalism in empirical sciences seems out of the question

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Citations of this work

Über den Grad der bewährung naturwissenschaftlicher hypothesen.O. -J. Grüsser - 1983 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (2):273-291.
Normative Rechnungslegungsforschung im Abseits? Einige wissenschaftstheoretische Anmerkungen.Rolf Uwe Fülbier & Manuel Weller - 2008 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (2):351-382.
Über den Grad der Bewährung naturwissenschaftlicher Hypothesen.O. -J. Grüsser - 1983 - Zeitschrift Für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 14 (2):273-291.

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References found in this work

Verisimilitude or the approach to the whole truth.Herbert Keuth - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):311-336.

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