Yablo’s Paradox and ω-Inconsistency

Synthese 145 (3):295-302 (2005)
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Abstract

It is argued that Yablo’s Paradox is not strictly paradoxical, but rather ‘ω-paradoxical’. Under a natural formalization, the list of Yablo sentences may be constructed using a diagonalization argument and can be shown to be ω-inconsistent, but nonetheless consistent. The derivation of an inconsistency requires a uniform fixed-point construction. Moreover, the truth-theoretic disquotational principle required is also uniform, rather than the local disquotational T-scheme. The theory with the local disquotation T-scheme applied to individual sentences from the Yablo list is also consistent

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References found in this work

Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Models of Peano Arithmetic.Richard Kaye - 1991 - Clarendon Press.

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