Deflationism and the gödel phenomena: Reply to Tennant

Mind 114 (453):75-88 (2005)
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Abstract

Any (1-)consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a nontrivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called 'semantical argument' for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that the deflationist has at his disposal such extended methods--methods which make no use or mention of a truth-predicate. (edited)

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Citations of this work

Deflationism about Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb, Daniel Stoljar & James Woodbridge - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Substantivism about truth.Gila Sher - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):818-828.
Semantics and Truth.Jan Woleński - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.

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