Can a many-valued language functionally represent its own semantics?

Analysis 63 (4):292–297 (2003)
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Abstract

Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem can be generalized so that it applies to many-valued languages. We introduce a notion of strong semantic self-representation applicable to any (sufficiently rich) interpreted many-valued language L. A sufficiently rich interpreted many-valued language L is SSSR just in case it has a function symbol n(x) such that, for any f Sent(L), the denotation of the term n(“f”) in L is precisely ||f||L, the semantic value of f in L. By a simple diagonal construction (finding a sentence l such that l is equivalent to n(“l”) T), it is shown that no such language strongly represents itself semantically. Hence, no such language can be its own metalanguage

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Citations of this work

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