Beth's theorem and deflationism — reply to Bays

Mind 118 (472):1075-1079 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Is the restricted, consistent, version of the T-scheme sufficient for an ‘implicit definition’ of truth? In a sense, the answer is yes (Haack 1978 , Quine 1953 ). Section 4 of Ketland 1999 mentions this but gives a result saying that the T-scheme does not implicitly define truth in the stronger sense relevant for Beth’s Definability Theorem. This insinuates that the T-scheme fares worse than the compositional truth theory as an implicit definition. However, the insinuation is mistaken. For, as Bays rightly points out, the result given extends to the compositional truth theory also. So, as regards implicit definability, both kinds of truth theory are equivalent. Some further discussion of this topic is mentioned (Gupta 2008 , Ketland 2003 , McGee 1991 ), all in agreement with Bays’s analysis

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,271

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-02-08

Downloads
74 (#216,835)

6 months
18 (#131,436)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Reflecting on incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
Proof and Truth.Stewart Shapiro - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (10):493-521.
How Innocent Is Deflationism?Volker Halbach - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):167-194.

View all 7 references / Add more references