Freedom and free will in Spinoza and Santayana

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 14 (4):243-267 (2001)
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Abstract

For both Spinoza and Santayana, freedom consists in a partial autonomy (enjoyed by a few) firmly situated within a naturalistic system; this makes no appeal to indetermination (although Santayana does not embrace determinism). Both have an earnest skepticism about the reliability of the conscious will and its place in free agency. Instead, they adopt a more classical account of freedom in terms of self-knowledge and reason. Despite many differences, their accounts of freedom draw close together for those obeying the dictates of reason or leading a life of reason. For both, this leads to a measure of spirituality.

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