A complex experiential account of pleasure

Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):153-165 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I argue for the Complex Experiential Theory. It asserts that pleasure is a pro-attitude toward a de se experience. I argue that it is better than its competitors. In particular, it is better than monadic theories that view pleasure as a distinct type of experience or a pro-attitude in isolation. It is also better than other non-monadic theories. In particular, it is better than accounts that involve pro-attitudes and beliefs in states of affairs or propositions (or ones that obtain, are true, or that focus on the subject’s own life). When conjoined with hedonism, this theory fits nicely into a building block theory of well-being.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-03-13

Downloads
97 (#167,635)

6 months
10 (#155,659)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Kershnar
Fredonia State University

References found in this work

Overpopulation and the Quality of Life.Derek Parfit - 1986 - In Peter Singer (ed.), Applied Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-164.
Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice.Fred Feldman - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (3):567-585.
Explaining the Geometry of Desert.Neil Feit & Stephen Kershnar - 2004 - Public Affairs Quarterly 18 (4):273-298.

Add more references