Visual awareness of properties

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):298–325 (2007)
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Abstract

I defend a view of the structure of visual property-awareness by considering the phenomenon of perceptual constancy. I argue that visual property-awareness is a three-place relation between a subject, a property, and a manner of presentation. Manners of presentation mediate our visual awareness of properties without being objects of visual awareness themselves. I provide criteria of identity for manners ofpresentation, and I argue that our ignorance of their intrinsic nature does not compromise the viability of a theory that employs them. In closing, I argue that the proposed manners of presentation are consistent with key direct-realist claims about the structure of visual awareness

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Matthew Kennedy
University of Notre Dame

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The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh, Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Heirs of nothing: The implications of transparency.Matthew Kennedy - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias, Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 221-254.

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References found in this work

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.

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