Abstract

In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates is consistently portrayed as failing to initiate into the philosophic those whom he engages protreptically. These failures are perplexing, given his steadfast commitment to the protreptic aims of his philosophic activity, and his knowledge of ta&d13; 3 ,rw tika&d12; . In this dissertation, I offer an explanation for why Socrates is portrayed as failing at his protreptic task. I argue that this particular dramatic detail is philosophically significant in that it is intended to help reveal fundamentally important aspects of the Platonic conceptions of , 3&d12;r wv and human being. ;As conceived and presented in the dialogues, erotic desire is the principle psychic force around which a person's h'&d4; qov is shaped or articulated. The philosopher possesses a unique h'&d4; qov ---being philosophically is a unique way of being human---and this h'&d4; qov is defined, fundamentally, by the philosopher's erotic desire for wisdom and virtue. Successfully initiating a person into the philosophic life requires channeling the person's erotic desire away from such "objects" as power, wealth, and public acclaim, and toward wisdom and virtue. Only through such a redirection is it possible to reshape a person's h'&d4; qov , and to initiate him into a philosophic way of being. Initiating a person into the philosophic life, in other words, requires changing who that person fundamentally is. ;Human being is inherently and inextricably incomplete, in need. This need, however, can never be satisfied. Thus, the desire to satisfy it is erotic, and to be human is to be erotically. This philosophic life, as the erotic life, is a life devoted to an existential and epistemic confrontation with this lack at the very core of human being. Thus, when Socrates calls an individual to the philosophic life, he calls him to a confrontation with the very lack in his being which he has hitherto attempted to alleviate by pursuing wealth, fame, or power. Initiating an individual into the philosophic life, then, is difficult, because the philosophic life is a confrontation with the very ontological trauma from which the individual wishes to flee