Simply too complex: against non-conceptual representation of (most) complex properties

Synthese 200 (6):1–24 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper connects the debate regarding perceptual representation of high-level properties and the debate regarding non-conceptual perceptual representation. I present and defend a distinction between representationally-complex properties and properties that are simpler to represent and offer ways of assessing whether a property is representationally complex. I address conditions under which such a property might be non-conceptually represented and conclude that most representationally-complex properties are simply too complex to be non-conceptually represented. Thus, most mental states that represent representationally-complex properties must be conceptual. This conclusion is relevant for a variety of philosophical theories (perception, ethics, emotions, pain) and is especially dramatic with respect to accounts according to which a mental state can non-conceptually represent such properties. As a test case for applying my argument I consider a group of such accounts: non-conceptual perceptual views of emotions, which my argument entails are false. I end by considering the implications my argument has for different theories.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The reemergence of 'emergence'.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):S63-S75.
The Reemergence of 'Emergence'.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):62-75.
What Incongruent Counterparts Show.David Landy - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):507-524.
Complexity Theory.Michael Strevens - 2016 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press USA.

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-12-15

Downloads
19 (#683,238)

6 months
5 (#247,092)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Avraham Max Kenan
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
The Aptness of Anger.Amia Srinivasan - 2018 - Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (2):123-144.

View all 37 references / Add more references