Savoir que l’on sait. La question de la transparence dans les attitudes épistémiques

Dialogue 48 (3):451-478 (2009)
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Abstract

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I revisit arguments for and against various theses concerning higher-order knowledge in order to fully gauge their impact on the principles of positive and negative introspection. I argue that the expression “knowing that one knows” has at least two salient understandings: the more common one, labelled “transparentist”, validates the principle of positive introspection, while the other which is less common, labelled “agrippean”, supports some of the arguments against this principle.

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Neil Kennedy
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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