Naïve Realism, Privileged Access, and Epistemic Safety

Noûs 45 (1):77-102 (2011)
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Abstract

Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind

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Matthew Kennedy
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 221-254.
The skeptic and the naïve realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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