Noûs 45 (1):77-102 (2011)
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Abstract |
Working from a naïve-realist perspective, I examine first-person knowledge of one's perceptual experience. I outline a naive-realist theory of how subjects acquire knowledge of the nature of their experiences, and I argue that naive realism is compatible with moderate, substantial forms of first-person privileged access. A more general moral of my paper is that treating “success” states like seeing as genuine mental states does not break up the dynamics that many philosophers expect from the phenomenon of knowledge of the mind
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Keywords | naive realism self knowledge privileged access safety perception epistemology |
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00805.x |
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Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press. pp. 221-254.
Concept Possession, Cognitive Value and Anti-Individualism.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2014 - Dialogue 53 (1):1-25.
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Explanation in Good and Bad Experiential Cases.Matthew Kennedy - 2013 - In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. MIT Press. pp. 221-254.
Naive Realism and Experiential Evidence.Matthew Kennedy - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1):77-109.
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