What makes perceptual content non-conceptual?

Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy (2002)
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Abstract

the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in

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Sean Kelly
Harvard University

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Kant and nonconceptual content.Robert Hanna - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.

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