The Ethics of Law’s Authority: On Tommie Shelby's, Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform

Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1):1-12 (2022)
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Abstract

Tommie Shelby argues that social injustice undermines the moral standing states would have, were they just, to condemn criminal wrongdoers. He makes a good argument, but he does not go far enough to reject the blaming function of punishment. Shelby’s argument from “impure dissent,” in particular, helps to demonstrate the limits of blame in criminal justice.

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Erin Kelly
University of Washington

Citations of this work

Is blame warranted in applying justice?Erin I. Kelly - 2023 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 26 (1):71-87.
Rethinking Criminal Justice.Erin I. Kelly - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (2):169-183.

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References found in this work

Marxism and Retribution.Jeffrie Murphy - 1994 - In A. John Simmons, Marshall Cohen, Joshua Cohen & Charles R. Beitz (eds.), Punishment: A Philosophy and Public Affairs Reader. Princeton University Press. pp. 3-30.

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