Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209 (2005)
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Abstract

A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration.

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10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00059.x

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Thomas Kelly
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.
Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 185.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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