Bias Defended

International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):234-258 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper, I clarify and defend some of the central ideas of Bias in response to commentators, with a special focus on the theme of skepticism. In response to Michael Veber, I defend the project of offering a modest as opposed to an ambitious response to the skeptic. In response to Jonathan Matheson, I defend my account of the way in which bias attributions function in contexts of interpersonal disagreement, as well as the claim that an unbiased believer will generally be in a stronger position to resist skeptical pressure from disagreement than a biased believer. In response to Brett Sherman, I clarify the way in which my account of bias accommodates the phenomenon of biased suspension of judgment, and I explore some of the connections between bias, suspension of judgment, and skepticism. In response to Jared Celinker and Nathan Ballantyne, I defend the possibility of emergent biases.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,596

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question.Jonathan Matheson - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):201-217.
Biased Suspension of Judgment.Brett Sherman - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):218-228.
Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers.Michael Veber - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):190-200.
Bias, Knowledge, Skepticism, and Disagreement: Précis of Part iii of Bias: A Philosophical Study.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (3):181-189.
The scope of epistemic focal bias: response to Blome-Tillmann.Mikkel Gerken - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Suspension of Judgment as a Doxastic Default.Mark Satta - 2024 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-25.
Bias: A Philosophical Study.Thomas Kelly - 2022 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Bias, norms, introspection, and the bias blind spot1.Thomas Kelly - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):81-105.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-09-26

Downloads
32 (#645,101)

6 months
32 (#112,564)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Kelly
Princeton University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.
Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.

Add more references