Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions

Erkenntnis 82 (4):929-946 (2017)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.

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Lorraine Juliano Keller
Saint Joseph's University of Pennsylvania

Citations of this work

Propositions on the cheap.Alex Grzankowski & Ray Buchanan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3159-3178.
Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.
Nontraditional Arguments for Theism.Chad A. McIntosh - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (5):1-14.
Act‐type theories of propositions.Thomas Hodgson - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11).

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
The reference book.John Hawthorne & David Manley - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by David Manley.
The nature and structure of content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.
Naturalism in mathematics.Penelope Maddy - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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