Social Philosophy and Policy 15 (1):216 (1998)

Authors
John Kekes
Union College
Abstract
The aim of this essay is to argue for the following claims: evil is prevalent; its prevalence is mainly the result of habitual and predictable patterns of action; these actions follow from the vices of their agents; in many cases, neither the evil actions nor the vices from which they follow are autonomous; it is nevertheless justified to hold the agents who perform these actions morally responsible for them; the widespread denial of this claim rests on the principle “ought implies can”; two versions of this principle must be distinguished; neither version can be used to exempt agents from moral responsibility for their nonautonomous actions and vices; this has fundamental implications for how morality and responsibility should be conceived
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DOI 10.1017/s0265052500003137
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References found in this work BETA

Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.
Critique of Pure Reason.Wolfgang Schwarz - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (3):449-451.
Being and Nothingness.Frederick A. Olafson - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (2):276-280.
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Asymmetrical Freedom.Susan Wolf - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (March):151-66.

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Citations of this work BETA

Is Evil Just Very Wrong?Todd Calder - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):177-196.
A Conception of Evil.Paul Formosa - 2008 - Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (2):217-239.

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