Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values

Argumentation 9 (4):577-594 (1995)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against space exploration in search of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The widely held supposition that search for pure scientific knowledge cannot be reasonably curtailed is identified as the fallacy of overriding values

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,247

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

“Intrinsically” or Just “Instrumentally” Valuable? On Structural Types of Values of Scientific Knowledge.Peter P. Kirschenmann - 2001 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 32 (2):237-256.
Value Pluralism and Valuable Pluralism.Joaquín Jareño Alarcón - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:91-95.
Science, Values and the Human Dimensions.Ladislav Tondl - 2001 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 32 (2):307-327.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-01-18

Downloads
27 (#427,599)

6 months
1 (#415,900)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Kekes
Union College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

William James and the Ethics of Belief.Richard M. Gale - 1980 - American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1):1 - 14.

Add more references